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INTRODUCTION 
 
Many think health and Social Security markets and social insurance programs are broken 
because they are increasingly unaffordable for too many Americans.  Bending the cost 
curve down has become a standard reference term for the main objective of reform 
proposals to slow cost increases or even reduce them.  This paper presents an alternative 
model with preliminary results of statistical analyses of complexity science simulation 
models with historical data that quickly bend the GDP curve up to increase affordability.  
 
This paper looks beyond popular reform models to self-organizing complexity science 
models based on chemistry, physics, and biology theories to suggest sustainable, long-
term financial reform proposals.  The foundation of these proposals is not based on 
orthodox market failure economic models but rather on thermodynamics in general and 
the time evolution of Shannon information entropy in particular: 
 
• Complexity Science:  One of the most important first principles of complexity 
science is open systems may eventually self-organize to degrade their far-from-
equilibrium (FFE) gradients.  That includes long-term inflation trends in health 
and retirement income and benefits cash flows.  
• Chemistry:  Ilya Prigogine helped develop the theory of dissipative structures to 
explain how chemical systems self-organize to degrade temperature, pressure, and 
other gradients.  A majority of the quantitative analyses in the paper measured the 
size and stability of simulated gradient degradation during self-organization. 
• Physics:  Edwin Jaynes helped develop physics theories of structured channels 
and maximum entropy production to explain how physical systems can very 
quickly, even abruptly, self-organize to degrade energy gradients. 
• Biology:  The role of entropy in a theory of the organization of life in 
evolutionary biology by Harold Morowitz and Eric Smith was used to suggest 
parallels with the time evolution of entropy in health care markets and social 
insurance programs. A key conclusion is our nation’s so-called broken health care 
is actually a cascade of continuous (or nearly so) phase transitions that seem to be 
turned on by networks of microscopic and emergent macroscopic variables, 
including entropy that function like gene switches. 
• Finance:  Simulation models of hedging income and benefits of Medicare, 
Medicaid, private health insurance, and Social Security in exchange-traded 
derivatives financial markets seem to quickly switch on intermediary cash flows 
that increase nominal annual GDP by about 11-14 percent.  The models of 
Prigogine, Jaynes, and Morowitz & Smith applied to derivatives markets show 
how that most likely works. 
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OVERVIEW OF COMPLEXITY SCIENCE FINANCIAL MODELS  
 
Logic of Dissipative Structures & Structured Channels:  One of the most common 
applications of complexity science models in physics, biology, chemistry, and many other 
scientific fields of study is to identify a far-from-equilibrium gradient in a system and 
then seek to document that the system self-organizes in some manner to degrade or offset 
the FFE gradient.  A small perturbation causes a temporary deviation from equilibrium.  
An ongoing flow of perturbations eventually causes the system to pass a threshold, 
beyond which it begins to build dissipative structures to degrade or offset the FFE 
gradient, rather than return to equilibrium.   
 
For example, a rain shower in the afternoon in a tropical jungle cools or degrades a 
temperature gradient that increased earlier in the day as the sun warmed the jungle.  In a 
process called evapotranspiration roots of plants and trees suck water out of the ground 
and transport it to their leaves where it evaporates.  The evaporated water rises into the 
atmosphere eventually to form clouds.  The clouds in time release rain showers, and the 
jungle cools.  The cycle of self-organized production of rain showers to cool the jungle 
repeats itself, again and again and again.  Clouds with rain showers are dissipative 
structures because they cool the hot jungle.1 
 
This paper applied the same idea of self-organized degradation of jungle temperature 
gradients to the potential self-organized degradation of inflationary trends in health and 
Social Security income (premiums and taxes) and outgo (benefits) cash flows.  The main 
research question is what are the dissipative structures that self-organization produces to 
cool (or offset) long-term FFE inflation in health and Social Security cash flows?  The 
concepts of entropy-driven biogenesis (organization of life) in part based on gene 
switching and signaling from biology, dissipative structures from chemistry, and 
maximum entropy production with fast structured channel formation from physics were 
joined together to provide a general explanatory framework to suggest an answer to this 
question.   
 
Edwin Jaynes advanced the concept of structured channels, and Ilya Prigogine advanced 
the concept of dissipative structures.  Although different terminology is used, they appear 
to be very similar FFE concepts for the source of the offset to or the degrading agent of 
FFE gradients.2  However, as discussed later in this paper, some aspects of their 
behaviors are different.  First, Jaynes explained that the formation of structured channels 
can be very fast. 
 
Second, Prigogine thought that dissipative structures were realized in low or minimum 
entropy production environments.  To the contrary, Jaynes believed structured channels 
were realized in maximum entropy production environments.  Third, Jaynes believed that 
the time evolution of entropy in many instances could be the most important determinant 
                                                          
1 For further discussion of cooling jungle temperature gradients see Into the Cool by Eric D. Schneider & Dorian 
Sagan, University of Chicago Press,  March 2005. 
2 Throughout the remainder of this paper “dissipative structures” will be used rather than “structured channels” based 
on the assumption that they are the same. 
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of the of the time evolution of macroscopic explanatory variables of FFE systems, such 
as the rising cost of health care. 
 
Quantifying the Time Evolution of Dissipative Structures Cash Flows:  A variation 
on estimating Solow residuals for total factor productivity from macroeconomic growth 
theory quantified the time evolution of these cash flows.  Statisticians  will recognize that 
an intercept dummy variable that measures the time evolution of a variation of the Solow 
residual is identical to a dummy variable that measures the time evolution of an intercept 
order parameter (sometimes also called a critical exponent) for second-order or 
continuous phase transitions.  
 
The answer to the main research question is the dissipative structures are new income 
cash flows that are uniquely determined by the characteristics of each inflationary income 
and outgo cash flow for each health and Social Security market and social insurance 
program.  The emergence of these new cash flows is triggered just like a single gene or 
combinations of genes switch chemical reactions on and off to produce biological 
development.  Hedging in exchange-traded derivatives markets turns on self-organizing 
calculations of how large dissipative cash flows should be because that’s how much GDP 
should increase to degrade FFE gradients and establish stability.3   
 
These new spread gains cash flows produce real, actual increases in GDP.  That is to say, 
self-organizing activity behavior requires computational rules to decide the magnitude 
and timing of emergent cash flows.  This paper essentially reversed engineered what 
those rules might have been had the best exchange hedging practices been used.  
Computational rules use hedged spreads for every natural hedger to simultaneously 
calculate how much the spreads need to increase or decrease across all hedgers to cause 
GDP to increase to degrade the FFE income and paid benefits gradients.   From a 
different perspective the dissipative structure behaves like a bicycle derailleur.  It finds a 
balance between the bicycle’s rider’s ability to continuously pedal and an acceptable 
speed to ride up/down a given height gradient or slope. 
 
The steps and results of the computational rules for self-organizing are similar to the way 
the Federal Reserve in 2010-2011 partially monetized the national debt.  The Federal 
Reserve, by analogy, has computational rules that “measure” economic activity to 
“determine” how much the economy should be stimulated in order to actually buy back 
government securities.  Then money is pumped into the economy. 
 
Dissipative structures may be real or may only exist in computational space to provide 
estimates of key parameters for further distribution to the self-organizing process.  If they 
are real, then somehow markets and/or governments actually pay hedgers their share of 
the dissipative structure cash flow over time.  If they are computational, they will cause 
                                                          
3 The author found just one citation in the literature on the financial impact of hedging.  In a March 1999 speech former 
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan suggested hedging and information technology improvements reduced the 
spread between residential mortgage rates and government securities by about 70 basis points.  No formal details of his 
estimate were provided and the speech is available at the Federal Reserve website. 
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GDP to endogenously grow as insurance markets and social insurance programs prosper 
and the money supply adjusts to changed macroeconomic conditions.   
 
Hedging Spreads:  Hedging the spreads between income and benefits are simulated for 
Medicare, Medicaid, private health insurance, and Social Security in two hypothetical 
Medicare Part A FICA taxes and benefits futures contracts.  The hypothetical results of 
the statistical analyses are consistent with the proposition that dissipative structures 
emerge as new cash flows.  There are two sources.  The first source is real or 
computational increases in the spread between hedged premiums and benefits for natural 
hedgers like governments and insurers who are short FICA and long benefits futures 
positions.   The second source is real or computational decreases in the spreads between 
hedged benefits and premiums for natural hedgers like employers and employees who are 
long FICA and short benefits futures positions.4   
 
The dissipative structure in hedged, FFE health and Social Security is spread gains.  
Spread gains are aggregations of component gains.  There are efficiency gains for 
premiums and benefits, hedging gains for premiums and benefits, and the sum of 
efficiency gains plus hedging gains is called economic gains for premiums and benefits.  
The difference between economic gains for premiums and benefits are called spread 
gains.5  Results of statistical analyses of the combined spread gains cash flows are shown 
not to be statistically different from key mathematical requirements contained in the 
theory of dissipative structures advanced by Ilya Prigogine.   
 
These mathematical requirements are dissipative structures should (1) be stable, (2) offset 
FFE gradients, and (3) be correlated across macroscopic distances.  Solutions to first and 
second-order difference equations meet these requirements for each cash flow because 
they are all moving equilibria equations (with eigenvalues not statistically different from 
one (1)) that are univariate linear functions of time.  Meeting the three requirements 
allows straightforward computation of 75-year fiscal gap offsets. 
   
Brief Summaries of Quantitative Analyses:  The following two brief summaries of the 
results are based on an econometric simulation model that hedges all the actual incomes 
and benefits, respectively, for Medicare (Parts A & B but not D), Medicaid (combined 
federal and state), Social Security (OASDI), and private health insurance in two 
hypothetical futures contracts.  The first is a hypothetical Medicare Part A FICA futures 
contract that hedges all income flows, and the second is a hypothetical Part A benefits 
futures contract that hedges all benefits flows.  Both futures contracts were based on the 
trading performance of the Chicago Board of Trade 10-year Treasury notes futures 
contract for the time period 1982-2003. 6   
                                                          
4 The second group of employers and employees want benefits to be higher and premiums lower.  Therefore they 
welcome reductions in the spread or difference between premiums less benefits.  The first group of governments and 
insurers are just the opposite.  They want premiums (or tax cash flows) to be higher and benefits lower.  They want the 
spread or difference to be larger between premiums less benefits. 
5 See Technical Appendix A that defines and explains these components of derivatives spread gains. 
6 Government taxes such as FICA taxes, general fund taxes (corporate and personal income taxes), and Part B 
premiums are “income” in this report, as well as private health insurance premiums.  
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The first is the value of the new annual cash (dissipative structure) as a percent of the 
combined value in income and outgo by system.  The second is the size of the fiscal gap 
for Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security over a 75-year period (2009-2083):  
 
• Preliminary estimates of the size of the new annual cash flow for each market and 
social insurance program is about 50 percent of the respective combined value of 
its income and its benefits. 
• A fiscal gap is the present value of the estimated unfunded liabilities as a percent 
of the present value of GDP for 2009-2083.  A dissipative structure offset to a 
fiscal gap is the present value of the dissipative cash flow as a percent of the 
present value of the same GDP for the same time period.  The Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) estimates of the fiscal gap for Medicare, Medicaid, and 
Social Security for this period are about 7-9 percent with an 8 percent midpoint.    
Tot Gov denotes the combined fiscal gap offset for Medicare, Medicaid, and 
Social Security.  Estimates of spread gains fiscal gap offsets include: 7 
• At a 5 percent discount rate Tot Gov fiscal gap offset is about 4.4 percent, 
equal to about 54.8 percent (54.8% = 4.4%/8.0%) of the 8 percent 
midpoint.  M & M (Medicare + Medicaid) offset is about 37.8 percent, 
and OASDI is about 17.1 percent, respectively, of the 8.0 percent CBO 
midpoint.8  
• At a 3 percent discount rate Tot Gov fiscal gap offset is about 97.6 
percent, M & M is about 67.6 percent, and OASDI is about 30.0 percent, 
respectively, of the 8.0 percent CBO midpoint. 
• Increasing discount rates further from 6 to 10 percent reduces Tot Gov 
percent of the 8.0 CBO midpoint from about 43 to 21 percent. 
• GDP increases in the same year about $1 billion for every $1 billion 
increase in the dissipative structure cash flow. 
 
 
THEORIES OF DISSIPATIVE STRUCTURES & STRUCTURED CHANNELS 
 
In the simplest case scientists usually treat shocks to equilibrium as temporary 
disturbances, drawn from some probability distribution, that in time die out, permitting a 
system to return to its old equilibrium.  But what happens to that system if disturbances 
do not die out, but cumulatively take it further and further away from equilibrium?  Then 
they accumulate like snow drifting against a wall in the shade rather than melting away in 
direct sunlight.  In this latter case in complexity science jargon the open system is said to 
be increasingly far-from-equilibrium.9  
                                                          
7 Fiscal gaps for state and federal governments for 2009-2083 are the sum of the present values of Medicaid, Medicare, 
and Social Security unfunded obligations divided by the present value of GDP.  The gap measures “the immediate and 
permanent increase in taxes or reduction in spending that would keep the long-term debt-to-GDP ratio at its current 
level” (Auerbach, Brookings Institution, “An Update on the Economic and Fiscal Crises:  2009 and Beyond”, 2009). 
8 M & M is the abbreviation for the combined Medicare and Medicaid fiscal gap and its offset.  OASDI is the usual 
abbreviation for combined Old Age & Survivors Insurance (OASI) and Disability Insurance (DI). 
9 In the simplest case a time series is in equilibrium when two successive values are equal or nearly so (≤ 2 percent 
difference in this report).  That simple system is increasingly far-from-equilibrium when successive values always 
increase the difference between the current value and the most recent equilibrium value by some amount.  Another 
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Prigogine on Entropy & Dissipative Structures:  To explain what happens to a FFE 
system, Ilya Prigogine developed a theory of dissipative structures, for which he was 
awarded the Nobel Prize for chemistry in 1977.  He believed that many disturbances in 
fact diminish as commonly believed, and a system returns to its prior or new equilibrium.  
But he also claimed an increasingly FFE system passes a threshold, beyond which it does 
not return to its original equilibrium.  Rather it begins to build a new FFE dissipative 
structure with three remarkable features.10  First, that structure is dynamically stable even 
if the system was initially not.  Second, it degrades or offsets the original increasingly 
FFE trend that led to its “emergence”.11 Third, the law of large numbers no longer applies 
to dissipative structures.  That reduces the randomness of interactions among multiple 
dissipative structures that increases their correlations across macroscopic distances.   
 
Jaynes on Entropy & Structured Channels:  In classical thermodynamics entropy is 
the logarithm of the volume of the phase space.  In information theory entropy is the 
logarithm of the “number of ways a macrostate can be realized”.  Said another way, the 
“macrostate of higher entropy can be realized in overwhelmingly more ways”.12    Jaynes 
thought information entropy is a measure of reproducibility in irreversible open systems, 
not disorder as so many scientists believe. 
 
He believed that microscopic fluctuations are “the driving force that makes an 
irreversible process go” with a “systematic movement of the macrostate at a drift velocity 
proportional to the entropy gradient times the mean-square fluctuation”.  Depending on 
circumstances, entropy is a determinant of the size and stability of emerging macrostates.  
In his conclusion to his paper “Macroscopic Prediction", he said: 
 
“Most recent discussions of macrophenomena outside of physical chemistry 
concentrate entirely on the dynamics (microscopic equations of motion or an 
                                                                                                                                                                             
increasingly far-from-equilibrium system is a limit cycle with growing amplitude.  Both are found in health and Social 
Security time series, although the former is more common. 
10 Although Prigogine received the chemistry Nobel Prize, his theories are still being modified and challenged by other 
chemists and thermodynamics experts.  See for example papers by the Russian chemist Georgi Pavlovich Gladyshev at 
www.statemaster.com and www.eoht.com.  The author suggests to readers that the results of empirical simulation 
modeling in this paper are very preliminary but apparently consistent with three major claims about dissipative 
structures offered by Prigogine.   These consistencies are sufficient to encourage other researchers to investigate 
complexity science modeling of health and Social Security as an additional or alternative policy option to be discussed 
in our nation’s ongoing health care reform debates. 
11 The example from chemistry he described in his Nobel Prize lecture was the Bénard instability, one of the first 
empirical chemistry applications of complexity science.  A horizontal fluid is heated from below creating a temperature 
gradient or spread between the temperatures at the bottom and top of the fluid.  “In the case of the Bénard convection, 
we may imagine that there are always small convections currents appearing as fluctuations from the average state; but 
below a certain critical value of the temperature gradient, these fluctuations are damped and disappear.  However, 
above some critical value certain fluctuations are amplified and give rise to a macroscopic current.  A new 
supermolecular order appears which corresponds basically to a giant fluctuation stabilized by exchanges of energy with 
the outside world.  This is the order characterized by the emergence of “dissipative structures” (See Time, Structure and 
Fluctuations; December 8, 1977; p. 267, at www.nobelprize.org).   Exceeding a FFE critical value is like a gene switch 
that triggers further biological development when, say, a protein exceeds a concentration threshold.  The dissipative 
structure degrades or offsets the Bénard temperature gradient by replacing conduction with convection heating.   
12 E.T. Jaynes,” Macroscopic Prediction” in Complex Systems—Operational Approaches in Neurobiology, Physics, 
and Computers, H. Haken, Ed.; Springer—Verlag, Berlin (1985); pp. 254-269.  The paper is online at 
www.bayes.wustl.edu/etj/articles/macroscopicprediction, pdf, p. 6. 
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assumed dynamical model at a higher level, deterministic or stochastic and ignore 
the entropy factors of macrostates altogether.  Indeed, we expect that such efforts 
will succeed fairly well if the macrostates of interest do not differ greatly in 
entropy.  But there are puzzling cases, as noted in the Introduction, where 
macrobehavior seems hard to understand in terms of any reasonable dynamics 
alone.  In these cases, the entropy factors may be the missing ingredient; as we 
learned from Gibbs, prediction of chemical equilibrium could not have succeeded 
at all until the macroscopic entropy was recognized.” 13 
 
 
Horowitz & Smith on Sudden Formation of Macroscopic Order:  In their paper 
“Energy Flow and the Organization of Life” Horowitz and Smith claim that: 
 
“Entropy can depend on currents as well as on configurations.  When it does, the 
principle of free energy minimization for open systems, which is derived from 
entropy maximization, can be extended to driven systems… 
 
“The resulting entropy-maximization principles can predict the spontaneous 
formation of currents, whereas the equilibrium entropy is maximized on 
currentless states… 
 
“The presence of positive feedback in a current-carrying system can create a 
threshold for the sudden formation of macroscopic order, and the crossing of this 
threshold is a phase transition equivalent in all statistical respect to equilibrium 
phase transitions.  The ordered state creates a channel between the environment’s 
input and output reservoirs with much better conductance that the equilibrium 
state.  Order in turn is maintained by energy extracted for the current between the 
reservoirs.” 14 
 
 
A lightning bolt is an example of the sudden formation of macroscopic order “when air 
suffers dielectric breakdown in response to a charge separation between the upper 
atmosphere and the ground.” 15   Hedging Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, and 
private health insurance in exchange-traded derivatives markets likewise triggers the 
sudden formation of new cash flows as if they were struck by financial lightning.    
 
They also said “life creates transport channels in the chemical domain, employing the 
more concentrated energy flows associated with molecular re-arrangements”.  To 
paraphrase the previous sentence, “[hedging] creates transport channels in the [financial] 
domain, employing the more concentrated energy flows associated with [financial 
engineering] re-arrangements.”  By further analogy, exchange-traded derivatives markets 
are a substrate where risky financial assets are disassembled and then recombined into 
                                                          
13 Ibid., pp. 14- 16. 
14 Morowitz, H. & Smith, E., “Energy Flow and the Organization of Life”, at www.genome.ad.jp/kegg/, pp. 4, 5. 
15 Ibid. p. 1. 
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new assets just as chemical bonds of reagents are broken and then recombined to form 
new molecules with new energetic capabilities for further downstream reformulations.  
These new assets are then delivered over time and across markets to hedgers.  The 
process monetizes health.   
 
Monetizing Health & the Demographic Dividend:  Health insurance in part, but not 
entirely, monetizes health.  Health insurance companies receive premiums from 
employers to pay for health insurance for employees and their families.  In addition some 
insurers pay employees and their families to participate in various preventative health 
programs.  A preventative health initiative in small measure further monetizes health.   
 
On a much larger scale, health in China and India has been further monetized.  The 
demographic dividend is  
 
“the economic boost that countries can receive when they shift from high rates of 
fertility and mortality—women having lots of children, many of whom die 
young—to low birthrates and longer life expectancies. 
 
“In a country where this demographic transition is taking place—thanks to 
improvements in health and other forces—the resulting temporarily large share of 
working–age people can, under the right circumstances, fuel a strong economic 
transition as well.  Under the wrong circumstances, it can lead to civil upheaval. 
 
“At the start of the demographic transition…women still have lots of children, but 
many more of those children survive into adulthood and old age.  Only after a 
while do birthrates decline.  And between those two moments not only do 
populations increase but the average age of people also drops.  You get a youth 
bulge. 
 
“…many economies in East Asia in the 1980s and 1990s experienced significant 
growth that could be attributed to the demographic dividend because educational, 
social, and government policies were in place to take advantage of the bulge 
generation’s numbers and potential economic productivity.”16 
 
 
The “economic boost” countries get when they shift from high to low rates of fertility and 
mortality, by analogy, is probably a dissipative structure.  Bloom and his colleagues 
“calculate that as much as one-third of the growth” in East Asia boom years were due to 
these health changes.17  The idea of a significant “economic boost” for China and India 
parallels the tentative empirical findings of significant increases in GDP from hedging. 
 
                                                          
16 Time magazine on March 17, 2011, published “Ten Ideas That Will Change the World”.  One of the ideas was the 
demographic dividend.  These quoted remarks appeared in a Harvard School of Public Health newsletter (4-17-2011) 
with the title “Time Magazine’s ‘Ten Ideas That Will Change the World” Features HSPH Faculty Research”, p. 1.  It is 
available at www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/features/coverage-in-the-media/demographic-dividend-time- bloom/index. 
17 Harvard Public Health Review, “Pigs, Pythons, and Economic Miracles”, Spring 2005, p. 3. 
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TABLE 1:  TOTAL ACTUAL VALUES, FAR-FROM-EQUILIBRIUM (FFE) 
VALUES, AND SPREAD GAINS (SG) VALUES FOR 1982-2003 ($BILLIONS) 
VARIABLES 
TOTAL 
ACTUAL 
TOTAL 
FFE ** 
TOTAL 
SG  
FFE % of 
ACTUAL 
SG % of 
ACTUAL 
SG % of 
FFE 
PI Premiums $6,414.4 $6,184.2 $2,893.3  96.4% 45.1% 46.8% 
PI Benefits $5,279.0 $5,099.5 $2,745.5  96.6% 52.0% 53.8% 
Total PI $11,693.4 $11,283.7 $5,638.8  96.5% 48.2% 50.0% 
        
HI FICA Taxes $1,995.3 $1,842.6 $2,325.5  92.3% 116.5% 126.2% 
HI Benefits $2,013.3 $783.5 $2,021.0  38.9% 100.4% 257.9% 
Total HI $4,008.6 $2,626.1 $4,346.5  65.5% 108.4% 165.5% 
        
SMI GF+P $1,256.7 $336.7 $990.3  26.8% 78.8% 294.1% 
SMI Benefits $1,245.5 $1,245.5 $291.6  100.0% 23.4% 23.4% 
Total SMI $2,502.2 $1,582.2 $1,281.9  63.2% 51.2% 81.0% 
        
MCAID Total $2,802.6 $2,802.6 $1,186.3  100.0% 42.3% 42.3% 
MCAID Ben $2,642.3 $2,642.3 $1,164.5  100.0% 44.1% 44.1% 
Total MCAID $5,444.9 $5,444.9 $2,350.8  100.0% 43.2% 43.2% 
        
OASDI FICA $7,318.0 $3,729.8 $2,532.8  51.0% 34.6% 67.9% 
OASDI Ben $6,521.8 $6,521.8 $3,136.5  100.0% 48.1% 48.1% 
Total OASDI $13,839.8 $10,251.6 $5,669.3  74.1% 41.0% 55.3% 
        
Total Income $19,787.0 $14,895.9 $9,928.2  75.3% 50.2% 66.7% 
Total Benefits $17,701.9 $16,292.6 $9,359.1  92.0% 52.9% 57.4% 
Total Inc + Ben $37,488.9 $31,188.5 $19,287.3  83.2% 51.4% 61.8% 
 
** All Total FFEs increase monotonically during 1982-2003 except HI FICA, HI benefits, SMI 
GF+P (Part B general funds + premiums), and OASDI FICA that follow limit cycles. 
 
 
FIGURE 1 
MONOTONICALLY INCREASING FAR-FROM-EQUILIBRIUM (FFE)
INCOME & BENEFITS CASH FLOWS FOR SELECT INSURANCE
MARKETS AND SOCIAL INSURANCE PROGRAMS (1982-2003)
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FIGURE 2 
LIMIT CYCLES FOR FAR-FROM-EQUILIBRIUM (FFE) INCOME
AND BENEFITS CASH FLOWS FOR SELECT INSURANCE
AND SOCIAL INSURANCE PROGRAMS (1982-2003) 
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Measuring FFE Cash Flows:  This paper is the first of at least two papers on gradient 
degradation by dissipative structures.  This first paper presents preliminary 
documentation that hedging produces quick gradient degradation results consistent with  
Jaynes and Horowitz & Smith.  The magnitude and stability of the degradation results are 
consistent with Prigogine and Jaynes.  The as yet unwritten second paper will attempt to 
quantitatively ascertain whether the time evolution of information entropy is also present. 
 
Table 1 and Figures 1-3 summarize key FFE income (tax) and benefits data for health 
and Social Security.  Table 1 shows that health and Social Security income (insurance 
premiums and taxes that include FICA, general fund, and Part B premiums taxes) and 
benefits cash flows to varying degrees are FFE.  Total Actual in the first column in Table 
1 is the sum of the actual annual premiums, benefits, and combined premiums plus 
benefits for 1982-2003.  Total FFE in the second column in Table 1 is the actual annual 
FFE premiums, FFE benefits, and combined FFE premiums plus FFE benefits for 1982-
2003.  Total SG in the third column in Table 1 are statistical estimates of the cumulative 
spread gains or dissipative structures. 
 
Broadly speaking, all time series in Table 1 fall into two different groups or patterns.  All 
Total FFEs increase monotonically during 1982-2003 except HI benefits, SMI GF+P 
(Part B general funds + premiums) and OASDI FICA that follow limit cycles.  First, in 
the former group they can closely follow the actual time series that make the sum of 
annual FFE about 90-100 percent of the sum of actual annual values.  The constant 
elasticity estimate of a 1 percent change in total FFE is about a 1.40 percent change in 
total spread gains.  Second, in the latter group they can follow limit cycles that make FFE 
about 30-60 percent of actual values.  The constant elasticity estimate of a 1 percent 
change in total FFE is about a 0.36 percent change in total spread gains for limit cycles. 
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Figure 1 contains six graphs of the FFE time series for income and benefits for the five 
insurance markets and social insurance programs.  The time evolution of these six FFE 
cash flows increases monotonically for the 1982-2003 time period.  In Figure 2 FFE time 
series for OASDI FICA, HI FICA, HI BEN, SMI GF+P (general funds plus premiums) 
are periodic limit cycles that rise like logistic curves, then collapse to near zero, only to 
rise again.   Periods range from 5 to more than 20 years. 
   
Dissipative Structures & Stable Moving Equilibria:  Hedging these FFE cash flows in 
exchange-traded derivatives markets may act as a gene switch that turns on the self-
organizing capabilities to compute the magnitude of and produce dissipative structures 
with the same three remarkable features described by Prigogine for the Bénard instability.   
 
First, statistical estimates of solutions equations to first and second-order difference 
equations showed that the only or dominant eigenvalue was not statistically different 
from one (1).  That result in combination with other details in Technical Appendix B 
showed that the solutions to the difference equations were consistent with linear functions 
of time making them moving equilibria, which are stable. 
 
Second, the dissipative cash flows on average were about 50 percent of the combined 
income and benefits cash flows for all cash flows except Medicare Part A (hospital 
insurance) that was about 100 percent. 
 
Third, the dissipative structures for Medicare, Medicaid, private health insurance, and 
Social Security all had eigenvalues not statistically different from one (1) and were 
moving equilibria linear functions of time.  That all solutions were linear in time showed 
examples of increased order of correlations across macroscopic distances. 
 
Figure 3 shows the gradient degradations for FFE all health and Social Security (Tot All) 
and for FFE all government (Tot Gov), discussed in the second bullet point immediately 
above.  The monotonically increasing line with a black rectangle is the FFE Tot All; the 
limit cycle line with an empty black rectangle is the FFE (Tot All – Tot All SG).  The 
degradation for FFE Tot All turns a monotonically increasing time series into a limit 
cycle with increasing amplitude.  The degradation of FFE (Tot Gov – Tot Gov SG) has 
the same general limit cycle pattern like FFE (Tot All – Tot All SG) except the 
periodicity is shorter.18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18 Generally speaking, the cutoff for equilibrium for this first, preliminary analysis of spread gains is that the difference 
between two consecutive values be less than or equal to 2 percent.  In the FFE (Tot Gov – Tot Gov SG) time series 
there were 4 instances that the year-to-year percent changes were 2.8, 2.5, 2.7, and 2.7.  When these values were 
incorporated into the analyses, the limit cycle emerged.  
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FIGURE 3 
GRADIENT DEGRADATION OF FAR-FROM-EQUILIBRIUM (FFE)
TOT ALL & TOT GOV COMBINED INCOME & BENEFITS (1982-2003)
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SPREAD HEDGING IN MEDICARE FUTURES CONTRACTS   
 
Spread Hedging Precedents:  Spread hedging is simultaneously hedging two or more 
risks in two or more different contracts at one or more exchanges.  It expands the 
possibilities of customized risk management strategies for diverse natural hedgers and 
increases liquidity for all market participants including professional arbitragers.  Spread 
hedging has a long tradition in exchange-traded derivatives markets like futures and 
options contracts.  
 
For example, hedging the crack is a reference to catalytic cracking of crude oil into 
refined products.  An oil refiner, for example, hedges the crack at the New York 
Mercantile Exchange when it simultaneously hedges the risks of paying higher-than-
expected crude oil prices by buying crude oil futures and being paid lower-than-expected 
refined products prices such as heating oil, gasoline, or jet fuel by selling refined products 
contracts. 
 
“Hedging the crush” is a reference to crushing soy beans into soy bean meal and soy bean 
oil.  A soy bean processor hedges the crush when it buys soy bean futures contracts at the 
Chicago Board of Trade to hedge higher-than-expected soy bean prices and sells soy 
bean meal and oil contracts to hedge lower-than-expected meal and oil prices. 
 
In the alliterative tradition of futures markets, the phrase hedging the cure can be used as 
a reference to insurers and government simultaneously selling premium and tax futures 
contracts to hedge against lower-than-expected premium and tax cash flows and buying 
benefits futures contracts to hedge against higher-than-expected benefits payments.  Just 
the opposite is true for employers and employees who hedge or have a fiduciary agent 
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hedge on their behalf.19  They can buy premium futures contracts to hedge against the 
risks of higher-than-expected premiums and sell benefits futures contracts to hedge 
against lower-than-expected benefits. 
 
Cure Spread Hedging in a Hypothetical Medicare Part A FICA and Benefits 
Contracts:  How should health and Social Security cash flows be hedged in a first-
generation exchange-traded environment?  The answer is probably launching one spread 
market with two cash settled futures contracts for Medicare Part A FICA taxes and Part A 
benefits.  The trading units, respectively, for these two contracts are Part A FICA taxes 
per Part A beneficiary and Part A benefits per Part A beneficiary.   
 
Over time additional futures contracts specifically designed for Medicare, Medicaid, 
Social Security, and private health insurance can be launched to reduce the “basis risk” of 
hedging.  The glide path of expanding futures markets over time is adding more contracts 
that reduce basis risk by increasing correlations (positive or negative) between unhedged 
cash flows and contract trading units.   
 
Simulating Hedging in Medicare Futures Contract Requires Data on the Trading 
Performance of a Real Futures Contract—Which One?: The three most important 
trading performance measures of a futures contract are trading volume, open interest, and 
deliveries.  Trading volume is the number of contracts traded each business day that can 
be aggregated to monthly and yearly levels.  Open interest is the number of outstanding 
contracts at the end of trading each business day.  Deliveries are the number of contracts 
held to maturity for a given trading month. 
 
Generally, rising trading volume, open interest, and deliveries over time indicate 
increasingly liquid or efficient markets.  Likewise, competitive markets are defined by 
whether any given buyer (or seller) can move the current market price.  Buyers and 
sellers want to hedge larger cash flows without adversely moving the price to do so. 
 
The hypothetical Part A FICA and benefits futures contracts could have been endowed 
with the trading performance of some other futures contract.  An ideal contract should:  
 
• be a contract that was solidly, rather than spectacularly successful after its launch.  
The 10-year Treasury notes contract was chosen because it is a work-horse, 
second tier successful contract.  It is neither a first tier, blockbuster success like 
Treasury bonds or eurodollars nor a bottom tier contract that traded poorly but 
nonetheless survived.  
• avoid contracts with very short maturities like Treasury bills or long maturities 
like Treasury bonds.  The maturity of 10-year notes better matches the average 
                                                          
19 Smaller, family-owned farms rarely hedge themselves.  Rather, grain elevators typically offer these farmers fixed 
prices for future delivery on a given day.  The elevators then hedge these fixed price purchases in an appropriate grain 
futures contract traded at a CFTC regulated commodity exchange.  It is highly likely that insurance exchanges 
conceived in the health care reform legislation as well as other financial entities will offer employers and employees 
fixed premiums and benefits and then hedge their commitments just as elevators hedge their fixed prices to small, 
family-owned farms. 
Complexity Science Models of Financing Health and Social Security Fiscal Gaps 
February 1, 2012 
 
 
Copyright © James A. Hayes & Associates, Inc., Albuquerque, NM  87109, February1, 2012. 
15 
time horizon of many stakeholders in health and Social Security business and 
policy decision-making. 
• be a contract that started after 1966 when Medicare and Medicaid started but at 
least 20 years or more before 2004-2005 when the research for this and other 
papers and book drafts began. 20 The 10-year note began trading in 1982.  It is 
very important to include a futures contract launch to study the early time 
evolution of the impact of hedging on dissipative structures. 
• be an interest rate contract, if possible.  The federal government understands 
interest rate derivatives because all primary government securities dealers and 
many holders of these securities in secondary markets hedge.  Also, many health 
insurers, employers, and providers routinely now hedge their interest rate risks.  A 
core appreciation for hedging and expertise in interest rate trade execution among 
many of the expected long and short hedgers in a Medicare FICA futures contract 
will speed up the acceptance of hedging in these new futures contracts.  Hedging 
health and Social Security cash flows is not any different in its essentials from 
hedging interest rates.21   
 
 
For all these reasons the data analyses in this paper are for 1982-2003, unless otherwise 
noted.  All statistical tests, including autocorrelation in this paper are small sample tests 
based on the small sample size (≤ 21) and the appropriate number of degrees of freedom.  
Data after 2003 that are now available in the public domain will be included in the near 
future to further update these analyses.  Even so, the data set with post 2003 available 
data may still require small statistical sampling tests. 
 
Cure Spread Gains Are Dissipative Structures:  Complexity science models of health 
and Social Security reform in this paper are initially focused on insurers in the private 
sector and government (mainly state & federal) in the public sector.  Insurers receive 
premiums and pay benefits.  Governments (receive combinations of FICA taxes, general 
funds taxes, or some premium income (mainly Medicare Part B SMI) and pay benefits.  
As fiduciary agents, capital markets will sell premiums futures contracts to hedge the 
possibility that their insurer and government clients might face unexpected falling 
income.  They will buy benefits futures contracts to hedge the possibility that those same 
clients might face unexpected rising benefits. 
 
However, there must be hedgers to take the opposite sides of those insurer and 
government short hedges for premiums and taxes and long hedges for benefits.  Those 
opposite, natural hedgers are employers, providers, and employees (beneficiaries) who 
                                                          
20 The research results reported in this paper began with a draft book submitted for publication consideration in 2005 
titled Hedging Chaotic Private Health Insurance Markets and the Uninsured and a revised draft submitted to a second 
publisher for consideration in 2006.  Neither was accepted for publication.  A paper focusing on estimating dissipative 
structures as fiscal gap offsets was submitted for publication consideration in an academic journal in 2009.  It was not 
accepted.  This draft paper is a revised and extended version of previous 2009 and 2010 papers. 
21 Very quickly a new specialty in financial risk management similar to financial engineering will be financial 
epidemiology.  The art and science of hedging a covered life is really no different than hedging a 20-year Treasury 
bond or a barrel of crude oil. 
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pay cash premiums and taxes and receive cash benefits.  They buy premiums futures 
contracts to hedge unexpected increased premiums and sell benefits futures contracts to 
hedge unexpected decreased benefits.   
 
How do self-organizing health insurance markets and social insurance government 
programs compute what the magnitude of the dissipative structure cash flow should be?   
All else equal, governments and insurers would like premiums/taxes to be higher and 
benefits to be lower.  In spread terms that means they want the spread between 
premiums/taxes and benefits to increase.  For example, let current premiums/taxes be 
$100 and let benefits be $80.  The initial spread is $20 ($100-$80=$20).  If 
premiums/taxes increase to $110 and benefits fall to $75, the final spread is now $35 
($110-$75=$35).  This pay premiums and receive benefits cure spread gain is $15 ($35-
$20) for government and insurers. 
 
Employers and employees are just the opposite.22  They buy premium/tax futures contract 
to protect themselves from higher than expected premiums/taxes and sell benefits futures 
contracts to protect themselves unexpected decreases in benefits.  In spread terms they 
want the spread between premiums/taxes and benefits to decrease.  For example as for 
governments and insurers, let current premiums/taxes be $100 and let benefits be $80.  
The spread is $20 ($100-$80=$20).  Now let premiums/taxes decrease to $90 and benefits 
rise to $85.  The spread is now $5 ($90-$85=$5).  This cure spread gain is minus -$15 
($5-$20) or $15 net to employers and employees.  The combined cure spread gains for all 
hedgers are $30 ($15 + $15=$30).  Two sets of statistical estimates of cure spreads gains 
must be estimated.  One is for governments and insurers; the other is for employers and 
employees.  They are not necessarily the same, and the signs of the spread changes are 
opposite. 
 
In the statistical analysis of the time evolution of dissipative structures for the 
governments and insurers natural hedgers regression coefficients for premiums were 
positive and coefficients for benefits were negative that determined the spread gains for 
this population.  The converse case was just the opposite for the population of employers 
and employees.  Their regression premiums and benefits coefficients were negative and 
positive, respectively.  The number of intercept dummy variables was unchanged, but by 
varying the number of years spanning each dummy variable, the signs of the regression 
coefficients flipped.   
 
That each set of dummy variables can generate opposite signs of regression coefficients 
is just like cellular signaling pathways turned on and off by a single protein: 
 
“In cancer, the protein known as TFG-beta is both a blessing and a curse.  Among 
cells just beginning to turn malignant, it acts as a tumor suppressor, inhibiting 
their growth.  But among later stage cancers this protein that also regulates wound 
                                                          
22 Rather than listing all the natural hedgers in this group, just employers and employees will be referenced. 
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healing and cellular growth becomes a tumor promoter that provokes 
metastasis”.23 
 
 
Varying the number of years spanning each dummy variable apparently sorted the two 
natural hedgers groups by how quickly their spread gains grew.  Surprisingly, turning 
cellular signaling pathways on and off by the maturity of earlier versus later stages of 
cancer growth may be just like switching on and off the signs of spread gains by how 
quickly spread gains grow--sooner or later. 
 
 
MODELING DISSIPATIVE STRUCTURES 
 
Data Sources:  Health insurance premiums and benefits annual data from 1960-2003 
were obtained from the National Expenditures time series NHE03 then available at the 
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) website (cms.gov).  That file is 
updated every year, and it includes two time series for premiums and “administrative cost 
& net income”.  The reader can estimate the benefits time series by subtracting the latter 
from the former.  Also, the annual Medicare and Social Security Trustees Reports were 
sources of their respective data. 
 
Ten-year Treasury note open interest, trading volume, and deliveries annual data for 
1982-2003 were originally obtained from the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT).  It was 
recently merged into the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). 
 
Estimating Hedging & Efficiency Gains:  A two equations econometric simulation 
model was developed to estimate spread changes between income (premiums or taxes) 
and benefits for Medicare (Parts A & B but not D), Medicaid (combined federal and 
state), Social Security (OASDI), and private health insurance due to hedging the spread 
from 1982-2003 in hypothetical Medicare Part A FICA and benefits futures contracts.  
 
The feasibility of hedging one variable in a futures contract for another variable is solely 
determined by a high correlation between the two variables or what the commodity 
markets like to call “cash and futures” markets.  In this instance it was determined by a 
statistically significant regression coefficient between the levels of premiums and benefits 
on the one hand and the level of Part A FICA taxes and benefits on the other hand.24 
 
• Efficiency Gains:  Efficiency gains were measured by the combined, statistically 
significant regression coefficients on income and benefits in separate equations 
from simultaneous changes in trading volume, open interest, and futures contract 
deliveries.  Analysis of the data in Figure 4 shows efficiency spread gains 
                                                          
23 Kathleen M. Wong, The Jekyll and Hyde Act of Oncogenes, ScienceMatters@Berkeley, Volume 7, Issue 54, Story 
3, June 2010. 
24 In an actual Medicare Part A FICA tax futures contract the trading unit would be FICA taxes per HI beneficiary.  In 
these simulations just FICA taxes are used without loss of generality in order to more easily compare hedging results 
measured in billions of dollars with other cash flows also measured in billions of dollars. 
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increased from about $12.9 billions or 4 percent of total spread gains of about 
$409.1 billions in 1982 to about $241.9 billions or about 15 percent of $1,475.8 
total spread gains in 2003. 
 
• Hedging Gains:  The model presumes the complexity science effect of hedging 
on private health insurance markets and related social insurance programs can be 
estimated in a similar but not exactly the same way the Solow growth residuals 
estimate total factor productivity in a macroeconomic growth accounting model.  
Growth equation residuals quantify the “total factor productivity” time series that 
is part of economic growth not explicitly accounted for by capital and labor in a 
macroeconomic model.  Analysis of the data in Figure 4 shows hedging spread 
gains decreased from about 96 percent of total spread gains in 1982 to about 85 
percent in 2003. 
 
Three or four intercept dummy variables (0,1 variables) are used to retrieve the 
time evolution of the hedging gains time series whose mean effect is embedded in 
the y-intercept term.   Statistically, the intercept terms are the mean effects of all 
excluded variables in respective premiums and benefits equations.  Intercept 
dummy variables in effect strip out the time evolution of one of possibly several 
excluded variables. 
 
Ex ante, there is no way to ascertain which one of the excluded variables has been 
retrieved from the intercept.  To confirm that the retrieved premiums and benefits 
time series are plausible estimates of their respective hedging gains, the data must, 
at the very least, be analyzed to see if Prigogine’s three requirements and other 
complexity science criteria were met.25  If the time series are not in equilibrium 
before the complexity science dissipative structure is formed and is in equilibrium 
during, then this result is tentative evidence that dummy intercept model is 
producing theoretically plausible outcomes.26 
 
  
                                                          
25 This report is a phenomenological study of the emergence of dissipative structures during phase transitions.  It “is 
used to describe a body of knowledge which relates empirical observations of phenomena to each other, in a way which 
is consistent with fundamental theory, but is not directly derived from theory” (Wikipedia, 
www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phenomenology_(science)). A recent, well-known example of another phenomenological 
study was the two reports in the late 1990s that the expansion of the universe was accelerating, not decelerating as most 
physicists believed.  Academics generally speculate that dark matter and dark energy explain this unexpected result, but 
there is no consensus on empirical proof for that speculation. 
26 The most important follow-up research project for these analyses is developing search algorithms to traverse 
systematically the state space of spread gains as potential hedging effects using intercept dummy variables.  For all 
natural hedgers this report found both positive and negative spread gains were effects of hedging on income and 
benefits for health insurance and social insurance programs in the same state space.   The empirical regularity was all 
long premium/tax futures and short benefits natural hedgers had opposite signs for intercept dummy variables 
compared to short premium/tax futures and long benefits natural hedgers.  The reason why may lie with the speed of 
learning to hedge, but that will be left to be evaluated by a future paper. 
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FIGURE 4 
TIME EVOLUTION OF TOTAL SPREAD GAINS, TOTAL HEDGING 
SPREAD GAINS & TOTAL EFFICIENCY SPREAD GAINS (1982-2003)
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The two equations model is estimated twice, first for governments/insurers (EQN 1 & 2) 
and then for employers/employees (EQN 3 & 4).  The latter second equations are 
italicized.  Also, the subscripts (x, t) on the income and benefits dependent variables 
indicate the xth insurance market (private insurance), or social insurance program (HI 
FICA, SMI, Medicaid, and OASDI) in the tth time period:27  
  
EQN 1 & EQN 2:  These spread change equations are for governments/insurers hedgers: 
 
Incomex, t = λ0 + λ1 Dum 1 + λ2 Dum 2 + λ3 Dum 3 + λ4 Dum 4 + λ5 HI FICAt +  
        λ6 Open Interest t + λ7 Volume t + λ8 Deliveries t  EQN 1 
Benefitsx, t = β0 - β1 Dum 1 - β2 Dum 2 - β3 Dum 3 - β4 Dum 4 + β5 HI Bent +  
         β6 Open Interestt + β7 Volumet + β8 Deliveriest  EQN 2 
 
EQN 3 & EQN 4:  Spread change equations in italics are for hedged employers and 
employees: 
 
Incomex, t = λ0 + λ1 Dum 1 + λ2 Dum 2 + λ3 Dum 3 + λ4 Dum 4 + λ5 HI FICAt +  
        λ6 Open Interestt + λ7 Volumet + λ8 Deliveriest   EQN 3 
 
Benefitsx, t = β0 - β1 Dum 1 - β2 Dum 2 - β3 Dum 3 - β4 Dum 4 + β5 HI Bent +  
                β6 Open Interestt + β7 Volumet + β8 Deliveriest  EQN 4 
                                                          
27 The four non-italicized Dum variables will span all years for 1982-2003, but the four italicized Dum variables do not 
span the same years within that time period.  The continuous variables Open Interestt, Volumet, and Deliveries are not 
changed going from the non-italicized to italicized equations.  Sometimes lagged FICA and Ben variables were 
included to eliminate autocorrelation and improve statistical performance. 
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The time evolutions of the spread changes in the income equation with or without italics 
are step functions with the following steps: 
 
λ0, (λ0 + λ1), (λ0 + λ2), (λ0 + λ3), and (λ0 + λ4) and italicized 
 
λ0, (λ0 + λ1), (λ0 + λ2), (λ0 + λ3), and (λ0 + λ4) 
 
 
The time evolutions of the spread changes in the benefits equation with or without italics 
are also step functions with the following steps: 
 
β0, (β0 - β1), (β0 - β2), (β0 - β3), and (β0 - β4) and italicized 
 
 β0, (β0 - β1), (β0 - β2), (β0 - β3), and (β0 - β4).   
 
 
TABLE 2:  NOMINAL, UNDISCOUNTED SPREAD GAINS BY MARKET AND 
SOCIAL INSURANCE PROGRAM 1982-2003 ($BILLIONS)   
YEAR 
HI 
MCARE 
SMI 
MCARE MCAID 
PRIV 
INS OASDI TOTAL  M&M 
TOT 
GOV 
1982 $73.2 $27.0 $34.3 $2.9 $156.7 $294.0  $134.5 $291.2 
1983 $74.6 $26.3 $34.3 $3.1 $157.5 $295.8  $135.2 $292.7 
1984 $94.2 $26.4 $35.3 $37.3 $173.1 $366.3  $155.8 $328.9 
1985 $97.4 $26.7 $36.7 $123.2 $174.3 $458.3  $160.8 $335.1 
1986 $116.5 $26.7 $56.2 $124.0 $174.7 $498.1  $199.4 $374.1 
1987 $127.3 $28.1 $56.9 $125.1 $177.3 $514.7  $212.3 $389.6 
1988 $126.8 $29.1 $62.5 $163.9 $205.4 $587.8  $218.5 $423.9 
1989 $130.9 $50.8 $68.4 $168.4 $206.6 $625.1  $250.1 $456.7 
1990 $122.7 $48.9 $66.3 $226.3 $229.9 $694.1  $238.0 $467.9 
1991 $133.4 $49.7 $96.8 $232.1 $262.7 $774.5  $279.8 $542.4 
1992 $157.5 $43.2 $101.0 $237.4 $277.2 $816.3  $301.7 $578.9 
1993 $194.6 $55.5 $103.4 $233.6 $282.0 $869.1  $353.5 $635.5 
1994 $216.0 $62.5 $109.6 $291.9 $293.3 $973.2  $388.1 $681.4 
1995 $217.1 $64.5 $107.7 $287.8 $289.0 $966.2  $389.3 $678.3 
1996 $229.4 $75.2 $132.1 $342.2 $297.0 $1,076.0  $436.7 $733.8 
1997 $243.2 $68.7 $132.7 $339.5 $302.5 $1,086.6  $444.7 $747.2 
1998 $267.7 $83.7 $157.4 $342.5 $317.9 $1,169.2  $508.8 $826.7 
1999 $290.5 $89.9 $157.7 $385.3 $315.8 $1,239.2  $538.1 $853.9 
2000 $328.5 $103.8 $173.3 $420.2 $345.4 $1,371.2  $605.6 $951.0 
2001 $350.6 $102.3 $184.2 $417.3 $337.3 $1,391.6  $637.1 $974.4 
2002 $367.6 $100.8 $206.8 $413.1 $342.2 $1,430.6  $675.2 $1,017.4 
2003 $386.6 $92.0 $237.3 $408.6 $351.3 $1,475.8  $715.9 $1,067.2 
          
TOTAL $4,346.3 $1,281.8 $2,350.8 $5,325.6 $5,669.2 $18,973.9  $7,979.0 $13,648.2 
          
*  M&M is the sum of the spread gains for Medicare (HI & SMI) and Medicaid programs.  TOT GOV is 
the sum of M&M and OASDI. 
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Estimates of spread gains based on Eqns 1-4 on this page are summarized in Table 2.  
The black triangle in Figure 5 is the positive HI FICA premium spread changes for 
governments and insurers, while the white rectangle is their negative HI benefits spread 
changes.  Flipping the sign of the negative white triangle for HI benefits for 
governments/insurers to positive black rectangle gives the positive HI benefits for 
employers/employees.  Flipping the sign of the positive black triangle for HI FICA for 
government/insurers to negative white rectangle gives the negative HI FICA for 
employers/employees. 
 
To estimate the total spread gains for hedging HI FICA and HI benefits for both sets of 
natural hedgers, not including efficiency gains, add the absolute values of all four time 
series for each year.  That total is about $3,270.7 billions for 1982-2003.  Total HI spread 
gains for governments/insurers was about 68 percent of the total or about $2,225.4 
billions, and spread gains for employers/employees was about 32 percent of the total or 
about $1,045.3 billions.  Overall, governments/insurers also had higher total spread gains 
than employers/employees.  However, spread gains for some social insurance programs 
governments/insurers and employers/employees were similar.  While flipping of the signs 
of the spread changes always occurred, the reason why is not clear at this time. 
 
FIGURE 5 
EXAMPLE OF FLIPPED SIGNS IN SPREAD CHANGES
EQUATIONS FOR HI FICA TAXES AND HI BENEFITS HEDGED BY 
GOVERNMENT/INSURERS AND EMPLOYERS/EMPLOYEES (1982-
2003)
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SPREAD GAINS FINANCING FOR HEALTH & SOCIAL SECURITY 
 
Spread Gains Financing for Health & Social Security (1982-2003):  Table 3 
summarizes the estimated first or second-order difference equation, theoretical solution 
equation to that difference equation based on its parameters, and the actual estimated 
solution equation for spread gains for each health and Social Security insurance market or 
social insurance program.  The Actual Solution equations on the third line of the second 
column of Table 3 forecast the spread gains for 2009-2083.  Present values of forecasts 
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are used to estimate fiscal gaps.  Table 4 summarizes mathematical and statistical 
properties that generate moving equilibria for the theoretical and actual solutions.  The 
how and why of theoretical and actual solutions are explained in Technical Appendix B.  
Fiscal gap offsets discussed later are based on actual solutions equations. 
 
TABLE 3:  SPREAD GAINS MOVING EQUILIBRIA EQUATIONS FOR 
HEALTH & RETIREMENT ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS & PRIVATE 
HEALTH INSURANCE 1984-2003 ($BILLIONS)             
HI:  Medicare Part A 1st Order Diff Eqn:                       Yt – 0.997Yt-1 = 14.5 
 Theoretical Solution HI SGt =                 74.6 + 14.5(t) 
 Actual Solution HI SGt =                        35.4 + 15.3(t) 
  
SMI:  Medicare Part B 1st Order Diff Eqn:                         Yt – 0.846Yt-1 = 9.4 
 Theoretical Solution SMI SGt =                26.3 + 9.4(t) 
 Actual Solution SMI SGt =                        12.4 + 4.3(t) 
  
MCARE:  Medicare Parts A + B 1st Order Diff Eqn:                       Yt – 0.963Yt-1 = 36.7  
 Theoretical Solution MCARE SG =     100.9 + 36.7(t) 
 Actual Solution MCARE SGt =              47.8 + 19.6(t) 
  
MCAID:  Medicaid (State & Federal) 2nd Order Diff Eqn:    Yt – 0.534Yt-1 –0.540Yt-2 = 15.5 
 Theoretical Solution MCAID SGt =        35.3 + 10.6(t) 
 Actual Solution MCAID SGt =                 14.0 + 9.5(t) 
  
M & M:  MCARE + MCAID 2nd Order Diff Eqn:    Yt – 0.365Yt-1 –0.682Yt-2 = 39.2 
 Theoretical Solution M & M SGt =       155.8 + 24.0(t) 
 Actual Solution M & M SGt =                 74.1 + 29.7(t) 
  
PI:  Private Insurance 1st Order Diff Eqn:                      Yt – 0.935Yt-1 = 34.5  
 Theoretical Solution PI SG =                    3.1 + 34.5(t) 
 Actual Solution PI SGt =                         31.8 + 20.2(t) 
  
OASDI:  Social Security OASI + DI 2nd Order Diff Eqn:   Yt – 0..510Yt-1 –0.350Yt-2 = 53.6 
 Theoretical Solution OASDI SGt =      173.1 + 36.0(t) 
 Actual Solution OASDI SGt =             158.7 + 10.4(t) 
  
TOT GOV:  M & M + OASDI 2nd Order Diff Eqn:   Yt – 0.475Yt-1 –0.583Yt-2 = 24.6 
 Theoretical Solution TOT GOV SGt = 328.9 + 16.1(t) 
 Actual Solution TOT GOV SGt =         232.9 + 40.0(t) 
  
TOT ALL:  TOT GOV + PI 2nd Order Diff Eqn:   Yt – 0.597Yt-1 –0.438Yt-2 = 45.0 
 Theoretical Solution TOT ALL SGt =  449.2 + 32.1(t) 
 Actual Solution TOT ALL SGt =          312.0 + 58.2(t) 
 
 
The first column of Table 4 lists the entities being analyzed.  The second column is 
whether first or second-order difference equations were estimated for each entity.  
Columns 3 and 4 summarize statistical significance testing of first and second-order 
difference equations to ascertain the stability of their respective spread gains equations 
based on two criteria.  The first criterion in Column 3 is the magnitude of the regression 
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coefficients, and the second in Column 4 is the magnitude of eigenvalues.  With respect 
to the first criteria Technical Appendix B shows that stability in part depends on (-β1 = -1) 
for first-order difference equations and depends on the magnitude of (-(β1 + β2) = -1) for 
second-order difference equations. As for the second criteria, Technical Appendix B 
shows that stability also requires the only or dominant eigenvalues to equal one (E = 1). 
 
TABLE 4:  STATISTICAL ANALYSES OF SPREAD GAINS MOVING 
EQUILIBRIA (1982-2003) 
 
ENTITY 
1st or  
2nd 
Diff 
Eqn? 
 
1st Diff:  -β1 = -1 ?  
2nd Diff:   -(β1 + β2) = -1 ? 
 
Eigenvalues (E) & Their 
Standard Errors (sE)28 
Start 
Year 
Dummy 
Variable 
Priv Ins 1st -β1 = -0.935, sβ1 = 0.045 
t-ratio = -1.444, 2-tail 
90% critical value = -1.725 
E = 0.935, sE = 0.045 
t-ratio = 1.444, 2-tail  
90% critical value = 1.725 
- 
Medicaid 2nd -0.534 – 0.540 = -1.074 
t-ratio = -0.172, 2-tail 
90% critical value = -1.753 
E = 1.049, sE = 0.061 
t-ratio = 0.798, 2-tail  
90% critical value = 2.132 
2002 
HI  
Medicare 
1st -β1 = - 0.997, sβ1 = 0.036 
t-ratio = -0.083, 2-tail 
90% critical value = -1.725 
E = 0.997, sE = 0.036 
t-ratio = -0.083, 2-tail 
90% critical value = 1.725 
1991 
SMI 
Medicare 
1st -β1 = -0.846, sβ1 = 0.112 
t-ratio = -1.375, 2-tail 
90% critical value = -1.725 
E = 0.846, sE = 0.112 
t-ratio = -1.375, 2-tail 
90% critical value = 1.725 
1998 
Medicare 1st -β1= -0.963, sβ1 = 0.044 
t-ratio = -0.841, 2-tail 
90% critical value = -1.725 
E = 0.963, sE = 0.044 
t-ratio = -0.841, 2-tail 
90% critical value = 1.725 
1992 
M & M 2nd -0.365 – 0.682 = -1.047 
t-ratio = -0.119, 2-tail 
90% critical value = -1.753 
E = 1.028, sE = 0.061 
t-ratio = 0.456, 2-tail  
90% critical value = 2.132 
1992 
OASDI 2nd -0.510 – 0.350 = -0.860 
t-ratio = -0.347, 2-tail 
90% critical value = -1.753 
E = 0.899, sE = 0.061 
t-ratio = -1.644, 2-tail  
90% critical value = 2.132 
1988 
TOT 
GOV 
2nd -0.475 – 0.583 = -1.058 
t-ratio = -0.147, 2-tail 
90% critical value = -1.746 
E = 1.037, sE = 0.061 
t-ratio = 0.602, 2-tail  
90% critical value = 2.132 
- 
TOT 
ALL 
2nd -0.597 – 0.438 = -1.035 
t-ratio = -0.080, 2-tail 
90% critical value = -1.746 
E = 1.025, sE = 0.061 
t-ratio = 0.407, 2-tail  
90% critical value = 2.132 
- 
 
 
If the two sets of criteria are met, then the solutions equations will be a moving 
equilibrium equation.  In particular, it is a univariate function of time.  All (-β1),  (-(β1 + 
β2)), and eigenvalue (E) estimates were not statistically significantly different from one 
                                                          
28 This paper uses the common convention that standard deviations of populations are denoted by σE and standard errors 
of samples are denoted by sE. 
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(1) at the 10 percent or less level (p ≤ 0.10) with appropriately specified degrees of 
freedom using small sample t-tests. 
 
In first-order difference equations the regression coefficient for the lagged variable is the 
eigenvalue.  The regression coefficient’s standard error is the eigenvalue’s standard error.  
In second-order difference equations the two regression coefficients are not eigenvalues.  
The quadratic equation must be used to solve for the two eigenvalues, and the larger of 
the two eigenvalues was tested for a statistically significant difference from one (1).  The 
statistical significance of each of these five dominant eigenvalues was based on a simple 
t-test with the same sample standard error for the group sample of five dominant 
eigenvalues. 
 
The fifth column was labeled Start Year Dummy Variable.  As outlined in Technical 
Appendix B, the statistical significance of the intercept is necessary to formulate the 
solution to the difference equation.  For six of the equations the initial regressions had 
intercepts that required an analysis of their time evolutions.  For the entities for which a 
given year is specified, the year denotes when an intercept dummy variable caused the 
intercept variable to become statistically significant at the 10 percent or less level.  That 
suggests that the intercept may be acting as an order parameter in a complexity science 
driven time evolution of the solution equation. 
 
Figure 6 shows the spread gains as a percent of the combined value of premiums plus 
benefits for health insurance and the combined value of taxes plus benefits for the social 
insurance programs for 1982-2003.  With the exception of HI Medicare, the entities 
relatively quickly settle into spread gains as a percent of combined income and outgo as a 
relatively constant 40-60 percent.  Abruptly settling into significantly lower or higher 
new patterns are hallmarks of complexity science driven changes described by Jaynes and 
Horowitz & Smith. 
 
HI Medicare spread gains settle into a range of about 100 percent or more of its combined 
HI FICA taxes plus HI benefits.  Why HI Medicare spread gains should be about twice 
any of the other spread gains as a percent of their respective income plus benefits is not at 
all clear at this time.  It could be a high value outlier from the search for plausible spread 
gains time evolutions or it could reflect something special about HI Medicare relative to 
the other estimated spread gains cash flows.  It was not thrown out just because it was 
about twice the magnitude in percentage terms of the other spread gains cash flows.  
Even so, it will have to be studied further.  The Bayesian inference steps recommended 
by Jaynes in his ‘Macroscopic Prediction’ paper were generally followed in this paper. 
 
Complexity Science Models of Financing Health and Social Security Fiscal Gaps 
February 1, 2012 
 
 
Copyright © James A. Hayes & Associates, Inc., Albuquerque, NM  87109, February1, 2012. 
25 
FIGURE 6 
SPREAD GAINS AS A PERCENT OF PREMIUMS PLUS 
BENEFITS OR TAXES PLUS BENEFITS 1982-2003
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FIGURE 7 
GROWTH OF NOMINAL SPREAD GAINS AS A PERCENT OF NOMINAL GDP 
WITH 0, 5, 10 & 20 YEARS HEDGING LEARNING CURVES 1982-2003
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Figure 7 shows the effects of learning curves on the time evolution of nominal spread 
gains as a percent of nominal GDP for 1982-2003.  Learning curves quantify how long it 
takes to hedge 100 percent of the hedgeable cash flows.  The curves in Figure 7 are for 0, 
5, 10, and 20 years learning curves.   Since the annual spread gains as a percent of annual 
GDP is roughly constant at about 11-14 percent, the learning curves reduce by about half 
what the spread gains would have been for 5, 10, and 20 years. 
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Preliminary statistical simulation analyses using nominal historical data regressed current 
GDP on GDP lagged one year, current total spread gains, and a dummy slope variable for 
total spread gains for (1982-2003) with the following results:29  
 
GDP0 = 294.1 + 0.901 GDP-1 +1.160 Tot All0 – 0.355 dum Tot All0 Eqn 5 
  (p = .020)   (p ≈ 0.0)                (p = 0.103)                 (p = 0.101) 
 
 
In general the statistical analyses in this paper used 10 percent significance cutoff levels.  
The preliminary estimate of the p-value for the regression coefficient for Tot All0 and the 
slope dummy are about 10 percent.   
 
The economy grows by an amount about equal to the sum of the dissipative structures 
because a $1 billion increase in total spread gains increases GDP by about $1 billion, 
assuming constant coefficients.  The time series of the increases in GDP due to Tot All 
spread gains is also a moving equilibrium with an eigenvalue not statistically different 
from one (1).  The analysis suggests that hedging leads to the emergence of 
computational spread gains that in turn leads to an emergent real increase in GDP.   
 
Spread Gains Financing of Health & Social Security (2009-2083):  Tables 5-7 
summarize spread gains financing of 75-year deficits.  Figures 8-9 show key results from 
Tables 5-7 in graph form: 
 
• Table 5:  Discounted Spread Gains Offsets To 75-Year Deficits For 2009-
2083 (Trillions):  These figures in trillions are based on the spread gains 
originally estimated for 1982-2003.  They were then extended to begin in 2009 
through 2083 using the moving equilibria spread gains equations that are linear 
functions of time.  The 2009-2083 period is used because the CBO and other 
researchers estimated fiscal gaps for the 2009-2083 75-year period and 
subsequent rolling 75-year periods.  A fiscal gap is the discounted unfunded 
Medicare, Medicaid, and OASDI obligations of the government divided by the 
discounted GDP for the same period.  Discount rates range from 1 to 10 percent. 
• Table 6:  Spread Gains Fiscal Gap Offsets Defined As Discounted Spread 
Gains As A Percent Of Discounted GDP 2009-2083:  The variable spread gains 
fiscal gap offsets are discounted spread gains divided by discounted GDP.   They 
are measured as percentages that reduce fiscal gap percentages.  Fox example, 
assume the gross fiscal gap is 8 percent and the spread gains offset is 5 percent.  
Then the net fiscal gap is 3 percent (8% - 5% = 3%).  Spread gains fiscal gap 
offsets are calculated for Medicare (HI + SMI), Medicaid, Medicare + Medicaid 
(M & M), private insurance (Priv Ins), OASDI (Social Security & Disability 
Insurance), total health (Medicare + Medicaid + Priv Ins), total government (Tot 
Gov = M & M + OASDI), and total all (Tot All = Tot Gov + Priv Ins). 
                                                          
29 The r-squared is 0.999, and the dummy slope variable for Tot All0 is zero for the first two years.  Starting the third 
year 1.160 is added to –0.355 for a net partial derivative of about 0.810.  Both 1.160 and 0.810 are not statistically 
different from one (1.0).  The standard error of the 1.160 regression coefficient is about 0.670.   Subscripts on right 
hand side variables indicated the current and lagged time periods. 
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• Table 7:  Spread Gains Fiscal Gap Offsets As A Percent Of The 8% Midpoint 
Of CBO Adjusted Baseline Fiscal Gap 7-9 Percent Estimates For 2009-2083: 
Using the hypothetical fiscal gap of 8 percent and a 5 percent fiscal gap offset in 
the previous bullet point, the latter reduces the former by 5/8 or 62.5 percent.  
Fiscal gap offsets as a percent of the midpoint of the CBO Adjusted Baseline are 
calculated just for Medicare, Medicaid, M & M, OASDI, and Tot Gov. 
 
 
In Figure 8 a 3 percent discount rate for Tot Gov yields discounted spread gains of about 
$61.8 trillion (shown in Table 4).  That’s equal to a fiscal gap offset of about 7.8 percent 
(shown) in Table 6, in turn equal to about 97.6 percent of the 8 percent CBO midpoint 
(shown in Table 7).  In discount rate terms the 3 percent rate is approximately equal to 
the breakeven point of financing nearly 100 percent of long-term government health and 
retirement unfunded obligations. 
 
TABLE 5:  DISCOUNTED SPREAD GAINS OFFSETS TO 75-YEAR DEFICITS 
FOR 2009-2083 (TRILLIONS) 
DISCOUNT 
RATE 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 
HI + SMI $61.0 $41.2 $29.0 $21.3 $16.2 $12.7 $10.2 $8.5 $7.1 $6.1 
MCAID $29.1 $19.6 $13.8 $10.1 $7.7 $6.0 $4.9 $4.0 $3.4 $2.9 
M & M $90.1 $60.8 $42.8 $31.4 $23.9 $18.7 $15.1 $12.5 $10.5 $9.0 
PRIV INS $62.0 $41.8 $29.4 $21.5 $16.4 $12.8 $10.4 $8.5 $7.2 $6.1 
TOT 
HEALTH $152.1 $102.6 $72.2 $52.9 $40.2 $31.6 $25.5 $21.0 $17.7 $15.1 
OASDI $39.0 $26.6 $19.0 $14.1 $10.8 $8.6 $7.0 $5.8 $4.9 $4.2 
TOT GOV $129.1 $87.4 $61.8 $45.4 $34.7 $27.3 $22.1 $18.3 $15.4 $13.2 
TOT ALL $191.1 $129.2 $91.2 $67.0 $51.0 $40.1 $32.0 $26.8 $22.6 $19.3 
 
 
TABLE 6:  SPREAD GAINS FISCAL GAP OFFSETS & NON-FISCAL GAP 
OFFSETS DEFINED AS DISCOUNTED SPREAD GAINS AS A PERCENT OF 
DISCOUNTED GDP 2009-208330 
DISCOUNT 
RATE 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 
HI + SMI 7.7% 5.2% 3.7% 2.7% 2.0% 1.6% 1.3% 1.1% 0.9% 0.8% 
MCAID 3.7% 2.5% 1.8% 1.3% 1.0% 0.8% 0.6% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4% 
M & M 11.4% 7.7% 5.4% 4.0% 3.0% 2.4% 1.9% 1.6% 1.3% 1.1% 
PRIV INS 7.8% 5.3% 3.7% 2.7% 2.1% 1.6% 1.3% 1.1% 0.9% 0.8% 
TOT 
HEALTH 19.2% 13.0% 9.1% 6.7% 5.1% 4.0% 3.2% 2.7% 2.2% 1.9% 
OASDI 4.9% 3.4% 2.4% 1.8% 1.4% 1.1% 0.9% 0.7% 0.6% 0.5% 
TOT GOV 16.3% 11.1% 7.8% 5.8% 4.4% 3.5% 2.8% 2.3% 2.0% 1.7% 
TOT ALL 24.2% 16.3% 11.5% 8.5% 6.5% 5.1% 4.1% 3.4% 2.9% 2.4% 
 
                                                          
30 Spread Gains Fiscal Gap Offsets apply just to Medicare, Medicaid, OASDI, and Tot Gov.   Spread gains Non-Fiscal 
Gap Offsets apply to private insurance.  Tot All is the sum of the Fiscal Gap Offsets and Non-Fiscal Gap Offset.  It is 
not included in Table 7. 
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TABLE 7:  SPREAD GAINS FISCAL GAP OFFSETS AS A PERCENT OF THE 
8% MIDPOINT OF CBO ADJUSTED BASELINE FISCAL GAP 7-9 PERCENT 
ESTIMATES FOR 2009-2083 
DISCOUNT 
RATE 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 
HI + SMI 96.4% 65.0% 45.9% 33.6% 25.5% 20.1% 16.3% 13.4% 11.3% 9.6% 
MCAID 46.0% 31.0% 21.9% 16.0% 12.1% 9.5% 7.6% 6.4% 5.4% 4.5% 
M & M 142.4% 96.0% 67.6% 49.6% 37.8% 29.6% 23.9% 19.8% 16.6% 14.1% 
OASDI 61.6% 42.0% 30.0% 22.3% 17.1% 13.5% 11.0% 9.1% 7.8% 6.6% 
TOT GOV 204.0% 138.1% 97.6% 71.9% 54.8% 43.1% 34.9% 28.9% 24.4% 20.9% 
 
 
Government actuaries estimate actuarial balances by discounting the Medicare HI and 
SMI programs at the “assumed rates of interest credited” to the respective trust funds.  In 
2009 the discount rates were, respectively, 5.0 and 4.4 percents.  Subsequent fiscal gap 
estimates used a 5.7 percent discount rate for the period ending 2085.31 
 
FIGURE 8   
OASDI, MEDICARE + MEDICAID (M & M) & TOT GOV (M & M + OASDI) SPREAD 
GAINS FISCAL GAP OFFSETS BY DISCOUNT RATE COMPARED TO 8% MID-
POINT OF CBO ADJUSTED BASELINE 7-9% FISCAL GAP (2009-2083)
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Let the discount rate for all fiscal gap offsets and non-fiscal gap offsets, for example, be 5 
percent for (2009-2083).  Then the Tot Gov spread gains discounted cash flow is about 
$34.7 trillions, and the Tot Gov spread gains fiscal gap offset is about 4.4 percent.  M & 
M is about 3.0 percent and OASDI is about 1.4 percent of the 4.4 percent.  Tables 5-7 
were deliberately built to allow different discount rates for all entities. 
 
 
                                                          
31 Medicare 2010 Trustees Report, pp. 78, 255 & 256.  When revised for the period through 2085, Brookings 
researchers used a 5.7 percent discount rate to estimate the fiscal gap.  Auerbach & Gale, 2010, “Déjà vu All Over 
Again:  On the Dismal Prospects for the Federal Budget”, p. 8. 
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FIGURE 9 
OASDI, MEDICARE + MEDICAID (M & M) & TOTAL GOVERNMENT
(TOT GOV = M & M + OASDI) SPREAD GAINS FISCAL GAP
OFFSETS AS A PERCENT OF 8% CBO MIDPOINT 2009-2083
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
Overview:  The central assumption of this paper is when FFE income and benefits cash 
flows in private health insurance, Medicare (Parts A & B), Medicaid (combined state & 
federal), and Social Security OASDI (OASI & DI) are hedged, real or computational 
dissipative structures are turned on just as genes are turned on in biological development 
to trigger a phase transition.   
 
Using historical data in econometric simulations suggested the collective dissipative cash 
flows partially offset all the income and benefits gradients by abruptly increasing GDP in 
the same year by an amount about equal to the annual sum of the dissipative income and 
benefits cash flows for that year.  For 1982-2003 the collective offset was about 50 
percent of the combined value of the annual incomes and benefits for all private health 
insurance markets and social insurance programs. 
 
The dissipative structure cash flows equations mathematically and statistically were 
shown to be consistent with moving equilibria equations.  In particular, the equations for 
the time evolutions for all cash flows considered collapsed to univariate functions of 
time.  The simplicity of the equations allowed for a straightforward calculation of 75-year 
fiscal gap offsets to study the feasibility of financing very long term unfunded obligations 
for state and federal governments.  Fiscal gaps are the present value of unfunded 
liabilities divided by the present value of GDP. 
 
An 8 percent midpoint of the 7-9 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates of fiscal 
gaps for 2009-2083 was compared to the dissipative structures also measured as fiscal 
gap offsets.   
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• At a 5 percent discount rate the fiscal gap offset from dissipative cash flows for 
Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security was about 4.4 percent or about 55 
percent of the 8 percent CBO midpoint.  M & M (Medicare + Medicaid) offset 
was about 37.8 percent and OASDI was about 17.1 percent, respectively, of the 
8.0 percent midpoint. 
• At a 3 percent discount rate the Tot Gov fiscal gap offset was about 98 percent, M 
& M was about 68 percent, and OASDI was about 30 percent, respectively, of the 
8.0 percent midpoint. 
 
 
The Promise of an Arab Spring Driven Health Care Reform:  What ostensibly 
recently began with the martyrdom of a single man in Tunisia led to the Arab Springs in 
Egypt, Libya, Syria, and other countries in the Middle East.  Some governments 
collapsed; others teetered.  But Arab Springs are the just the “creation of energy channels 
by means of phase transition[s]” discussed by Horowitz & Smith.32   
 
An Arab Spring, world-wide, FFE health care reform initiative could be launched in 3-5 
years at derivatives exchanges in financial capitals in the United States, Europe, and 
Asia.33  The preliminary statistical analyses in this paper tentatively estimated that 
hedging virtually all health insurance markets and social insurance programs in the 
United States would increase annual nominal economic growth by about 11-14 percent.  
A less complete, slower launch would have slower economic growth.   
 
Hedging health and retirement might be the best additional path for developed countries 
to prosperity.  If it works, hedging would trigger a decrease in the severity of the 
pervasive debt crises of many developed countries.  Ironically, in significant measure 
their debt crises sprang from their unfunded liabilities for social insurance programs. 
 
Also, if time series of any measures of global health in underdeveloped economies are 
significantly FFE and are highly correlated with health care futures in the financial 
capitals, they can be partially financed by cross-hedging. 
 
Hedging Acts of Nature or God & Hedging Public Policy:  High correlations between 
other health and retirement cash flows and Medicare Part A tax and benefits cash flows 
are essential to launching these first-generation health futures markets.  But the debut of 
Medicare FICA and benefits futures contracts should be seen in a broader landscape of 
not just hedging health and retirement cash flows and untoward acts of God or nature that 
destroy crops but also hedging “public policy”.    
                                                          
32 Op cit, p. 5. 
33 It is important to point out that the recent debacle in financial markets in the United States over “derivatives” 
occurred in over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives that included the now famous credit default swaps.  The derivatives 
trading proposal in this paper emphasizes exchange-traded derivatives.  To the author’s knowledge there were no 
defaults in any exchange-traded derivatives including currencies and interest rate instruments during this time.  All 
derivatives are just insurance policies that are usually carefully designed to monetize various measures of risk by 
trading them.  In financial terms the process of quantifying new specific measures of risk to be traded is called 
intermediation. 
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Hedging Medicare first and now, based on complexity science principles, in time will 
lead to hedging macroeconomic fiscal and monetary aggregates like taxes, GDP, and 
money supply in the United States and around the world.  Hedging will also help finance 
affordable congressional and state legislation.  Hedging our nation’s annual federal 
budget is no different than hedging expected agricultural crop yields. 
 
The door to hedging public policy began to swing open in the 1970s with the publication 
in the Journal of Political Economy (JPE) of the Black Scholes option pricing model and 
the nearly simultaneous launch of exchange-traded currency and interest rate futures in 
Chicago. 
 
Now the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) has already modestly started trading 
derivatives on government news releases of various measures of economic activity such 
as non-farm payroll.  The trading market is called Economic Event.  Start hedging health 
and retirement in the United States, and we’ll witness a world-wide expansion of 
exchange-traded derivatives financing of government. 
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX A: 
BRIEF SUMMARY OF SPREAD HEDGING COMPONENTS 
 
 
Efficiency Gains:  Efficiency gains are the combined effects, if any, of changes in 
trading volume, open interest, and deliveries on premiums and benefits.  Commodity 
markets use words like efficiency gains to describe the effects of increased trading 
volume, open interest, and deliveries on the bid-ask spread or other measures of increased 
efficiency.  In this study open interest and trading volume are almost always statistically 
significant, although their signs sometime switch.  Deliveries are not statistically 
significant as often.  Efficiency gains can have positive or negative effects on a gradient: 
 
• Pe,t = premiums efficiency gains at time t            Eqn A-1 
• Be,t = benefits efficiency gains at time t.            Eqn A-2 
 
Hedging Gains:  Hedging gains can be positive or negative for premiums or benefits: 
 
• Ph,t = premiums hedging gains at time t             Eqn A-3 
• Bh,t = benefits hedging gains at time t.             Eqn A-4 
 
Economic Gains:  Premiums and benefits economic gains are the sums of their 
respective efficiency and hedging gains: 
 
• (Ph,t + Pe,t) = premiums economic gains (hedging + efficiency) at 
 time t                   Eqn A-5     
• (Bh,t + Be,t) = benefits economic gains (hedging + efficiency) at  
time t.                    Eqn A-6 
     
 Spread Gains:  For governments and insurers spread gains are the difference between 
premium economic gains and benefits economic gains.  Positive spread gains are realized 
when simultaneously hedging premiums and benefits increases their spread:34 
 
• SGt = (Ph,t + Pe,t) – (Bh,t + Be,t) = spread gains at time t            Eqn A-7 
• Sf,t = Si,t + SGt  =  (Pt + Ph,t + Pe,t) – (Bt + Bh,t + Be,t) = time t  
final spread                  Eqn A-8 
 
All the individual terms in (Ph,t + Pe,t) and (Bh,t + Be,t) in principle can be negative or 
positive.  In practice usually (Ph,t + Pe,t) is positive, and usually (Bh,t + Be,t) is negative  
(- Bh,t - Be,t) for governments and insurers.  Consequently, when a negative (Bh,t + Be,t) is 
subtracted from a positive (Ph,t + Pe,t), the result is an even larger positive number.  
Spread gains for governments and insurers at time t can be rewritten as: 
 
• SGt = (Ph,t + Pe,t) – (- Bh,t - Be,t) =  (Ph,t + Pe,t + Bh,t + Be,t).         Eqn A- 9 
                                                          
34 See the discussion on pages 18-19 for how these formulas change when they are applied to employees and 
employers.  The signs of these equations are reversed or “flipped”. 
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX B: 
MODELING STABILITY IN HEALTH & 
SOCIAL SECURITY SPREAD GAINS CASH FLOWS 
 
 
Eigenvalues must be estimated to ascertain stability in insurance markets and social 
insurance programs during simulated hedging.  Spread gains for insurance, Medicare, and 
Social Security had eigenvalues that were not statistically significantly different from one 
(1).  The importance of eigenvalues not being statistically significantly different from one 
(1), together with other statistical results discussed below, is the possibility that spread 
gains series for all health insurance and entitlement programs have moving equilibria 
general solutions.  If so, the results are consistent with Prigogine’s claim that new, stable 
dissipative structures are part of an increasingly ordered space-time structure.   
 
The organization of this Technical Appendix B is first a brief review of estimating 
eigenvalues, and then an analysis of moving equilibria in social insurance programs that 
was labeled Tot Gov in preceding pages.   An analysis of moving equilibria paves the 
way to showing how and how much hedging entitlement programs can pay for very long-
dated macroeconomic deficits measured in fiscal gap terms. 
 
Estimating Second-Order Difference Equation Eigenvalues for Moving Equilibria:  
Several but not all private health insurance markets and social insurance programs can be 
modeled by second-order difference equations.  The reason in part is due to actuaries who 
routinely use 18 months old or older historical data to help them estimate future 
premiums and benefits.  
  
The basic form of the second-order difference regression equation for statistically 
estimating its two eigenvalues is Eqn B-1:  
 
Yt = β0 + β1Yt-1 + β2Yt-2.                                                                               Eqn B-1 
   
                                          
It can be rearranged as a homogeneous equation with a non-zero constant on the right-
hand-side of Eqn B-2: 
 
Yt - β1Yt-1 - β2Yt-2 = β0.                                                                                 Eqn B-2 
 
 
The two regression coefficients on the left-hand side of the equation (β1 & β2) of Eqn  B-2 
are then inserted into the following characteristic equation.  The two roots (sometimes 
denoted by b1 & b2) of Eqn B-3 are the eigenvalues: 
 
b1, b2 = ((-β1 ± (β12 - 4(-β 2))½)/2).                                                               Eqn B-3 
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The two eigenvalues (b1 & b2) are then used to construct the complementary function, 
which is the deviation from equilibrium in the general solution, defined in Eqn B-4: 
  
A1(b1)t +A2(b2)t,                                                                                           Eqn B-4 
 
 
A1 and A2 are definitizing coefficients based on the first two values of the time series for 
the second-order difference equation.   The constant term β0 (in addition to β1 and β2) is 
used to calculate the particular integral or equilibrium.35  The general solution to the 
second-order difference equation is the sum of the complementary function (deviation 
from equilibrium) and the particular integral (equilibrium).   
 
Spread Gains Eigenvalues Are Not Statistically Significantly Different from One:  
The two Tot Gov eigenvalues estimates are (b1 = 1.037) and (b2 = -0.562), so the 
complementary function (Eqn B-5) is 
 
Yc = A1(1.037)t  + A2(-0.562)t .                                                                   Eqn B-5 
 
 
The limit of the second term in Eqn B-5 is zero because the absolute value of a number 
less than one raised to successively higher integer values approaches zero.  Also, if (b1 = 
1.037) is not statistically different from one, then it is replaced by (b1 = 1.000) and 
A1(1.037)t becomes A1(1.000)t, which simplifies to just A1, thereby definitizing A1 = Y0. 
 
Mathematical Requirements for Moving Equilibrium:  When the sum of the 
regression coefficients in Eqn B-2 is not equal to minus 1 as shown in Eqn B-6, then the   
 
(β1 + β2) ≠ -1                                                                                                Eqn B-6 
 
 
particular integral equation (Yp) that specifies a fixed equilibrium36 is Eqn B-7: 
 
Yp = (β0) / (1 + β1 + β2).                                                                               Eqn B-7 
 
 
However, when the sum of the regression coefficients in Eqn B-6 is not statistically, 
significantly different from minus one (–1), the denominator of Eqn B-7 is about zero.  If 
so, it has to be rewritten as Eqn B-8 for a particular integral of a moving equilibrium:37  
 
  Yp = (β0 / (β1 +2))t.                                  Eqn B-8 
                                                          
35 See chapter 17 in Fundamental Methods of Mathematical Economics (2nd ed) by Alpha C. Chiang, McGraw Hill 
Book Company, 1974 for a discussion of eigenvalues estimation.  Also, eigenvalues have a sampling distribution and a 
standard error.   
36 See Chiang, pp. 579-580 (1974) for examples and explanation.  In Chang the notation of c for constant and a1 and a2 
for the regression coefficients were replaced, respectively, by β0, β1, and β2, where appropriate. 
37 See Chiang, p. 580. 
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General Solutions Equations for Stable & Unstable Spreads in Tot Gov Social 
Insurance Programs:  If spread gains in Tot Gov (social insurance programs) were 
stable with a fixed equilibrium, then the general solution equation would have been Eqn 
B-9 with the absolute values of b1 and b2 less than one.  If spreads gains in Tot Gov were 
a moving equilibrium, the general solution equation would be Eqn B-10 with the absolute 
value of b1 not statistically significantly different from one.   
 
 Yt = [A1(b1)t +A2(b2)t ] + [β0 / (1 + β1 + β2)].                                              Eqn B-9                                                                                                                                                               
 
Yt = Yc  + Yp  = A1 + (β0 / (β1 +2))t .                                                          Eqn B-10 
 
 
Spread Gains Are a Linear Function of Time:  The only variable in Eqn B-10 is time 
(t).  Three mathematical considerations unexpectedly and simultaneously conspire to 
make the general solution of the second-order difference equation for spread gains a 
linear function of time: 
 
• The sum of β1 and β2 from Eqn B-2 was not statistically significantly different 
from minus one.  That is a precondition for rejecting a fixed equilibrium model 
and testing for a moving equilibrium model. 
 
• The dominant eigenvalue was not statistically significantly different from plus 
one.  That is a precondition for a moving equilibrium. 
 
• The constant in the second-order difference equation was statistically significant, 
which made the particular integral a function of time (t), given the moving 
equilibrium just described.  β0 is the only constant in the numerator of the 
coefficient of (t) in Eqn B-10.  If β0 were zero, the coefficient would be zero. 
 
 
For example, when the values of the first datum A1 in the time series and the two 
regression coefficients β0 & β1 are put into Eqn B-10, the prediction of the mathematical 
model for TOT GOV SGt  is Eqn B-11 for t = 3, ..., n for 1984-2003:  
                                     
TOT GOV SGt = Yt = 328.9 + 16.1 (t).                                                     Eqn B-11 
 
 
Fitting an OLS statistical straight line to the TOT GOV SGt actual data for 1984-2003 is 
Eqn B-12.  All Actual Solution equations in Table 3 are based on fitted spread gains: 
 
TOT GOV SGt = Yt = 232.9 + 40.0 (t).           Eqn B-12 
 
 
Estimating First-Order Difference Equation Eigenvalues & Moving Equilibria:  
Details of the estimation of eigenvalues and moving equilibria for first-order difference 
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equations largely follow the preceding material for second-order difference equations.  
They are summarized here, and additional details are in Chiang. 
 
The general form of the particular integral for a first-order difference equation is:  
 
Yp = β0 / (1 + β1).                                                                                      Eqn B-13 
 
 
Recall the convention that a positive β1 is on the right-hand side of the equal sign and 
negative on the left-hand side and that Eqn B-13 uses the left-hand-side sign practice.  β1 
(which coincidentally is the eigenvalue) cannot be negative one (-1) and still use Eqn B-
13.  Just like the case for second-order difference equations, an alternative must be 
specified.  The particular integral becomes Eqn B-14 and the general solution becomes 
Eqn B-15.  Again, the general solution becomes a univariate function of time, just as it 
was for second-order difference equations: 
 
 Yp = β0 t               Eqn B-14 
 
 Yt = Y0 + β0 t.               Eqn B-15 
 
 
Estimating Fiscal Gap Offsets:  The 75-year fiscal gap offset (FGO) percent is just the 
present value (PV) of Eqn B-15 for first-order difference equations or Eqn B-10 for 
second-order difference equations divided by the present value (PV) of GDP for the same 
time period.  Estimates of present value GDPs are available in recent annual Medicare 
Trustee Reports.  For Tot Gov for (2009-2083) the general FGO equation is Eqn B-16, 
and the specific FGO equation is Eqn B-17: 
 
FGOTot Gov = (PV Tot Gov)/ (PV GDP)           Eqn B-16 
 
FGOTot Gov = ∑ t  [ (232.9 + 40.0 (t))/(1 + r)^t ] /  (PV GDP),        Eqn B-17 
           t = 1, 2, …,75.          
 
           where r = discount rate. 
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